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Strikes and labour relations in China 
Tim Pringle 
 
ntroduction  
Article One of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004) 
could not be clearer. China is a “socialist state under the people’s 
democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance 
of workers and peasants”.1 This apparent collective “exceptionality” of 
China stands in stark contrast to the dominant political ideologies of the 
current individualistic neo-liberal era of capitalist globalisation. However, 
when I look at China through a lens of labour relations and the class 
struggles they generate, the case for China’s “generality” – as opposed to 
“exceptionality” – hoves into view: it is very clear that the country is 
marked by high inequality, a poor implementation of labour laws and an 
obvious power imbalance between the forces of capital and the forces of 
labour relations in which the state mostly supports the former. Seen through 
this lens, China no longer resembles a state “led by the working class” but 
rather a state focussed on containing one that is finding its voice. It is this 
contentious dynamic that I examine in this paper.  
My paper is organised into four sections and concludes with some cautious 
observations on the future development of the nascent labour movement in 
China. The first section shows how economic reform has brought structural 
changes to China’s working class while placing the processes that generated 
these changes in a global context. I conclude the section with data on the 
incidence of resistance to the processes. Section two briefly unpacks the 
                                                 
1
 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Available at 
[http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm] 
Accessed May 20, 2015. 
I 
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trajectory of resistance which, I suggest, has moved from defensive to 
offensive although hardly in a uniform manner. In the third section, I turn to 
the state’s response – including the ACFTU – to class struggles. The fourth 
section discusses specific examples of significant strikes in Guangdong 
province and attempts by the party-led ACFTU to support, deflect or squash 
them.  
The data and motivation for this paper comes from interviews with workers, 
workers’ representatives, labour NGOs (LNGO) and union figures during 
two fieldwork trips in the summers of 2013 and 2014. In total, I carried out 
semi-structured interviews with six workers representatives, 12 LNGO staff 
members and two trade union officials in Guangdong, Beijing and Hong 
Kong. I also draw on data from supervised field work with 23 sanitation 
workers conducted in July 2013 by an LNGO with almost two decades of 
experience of operating in Guangdong. This research was supplemented 
with two days of focus group discussions with four workers’ representatives 
from the Lide strike in July 2015. Furthermore, I also make use of 
secondary materials drawn from academic journals and books, traditional 
and alternative media resources and labour NGO reports in Chinese and 
English. Some of the latter material is not publicly available, but on file with 
the author. Dictated by my fieldwork location of Guangdong, this paper 
draws chiefly on evidence and strikes in this province. 
  
1. The Socialist Market Economy and Capitalist Labour Relations 
The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 opened up a power struggle that would 
determine the future direction of China. Put crudely, on one side the Maoists 
argued for (a) a continuation of the command economy based on the 
privileging of ideology over empirical-technical realities; (b) relative 
equality and; (c) a Party-determined mass line. On the other side were more 
centrist CPC cadres lined up behind a resurgent Deng Xiaoping. A veteran 
revolutionary and senior Communist Party of China (CPC) leader, Deng had 
been a target of Mao’s Red Guards during the turbulent early years of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-69) and was sent to the countryside to ponder his 
ideological shortcomings as a “capitalist roader” while, among other duties, 
cleaning public toilets. Mao’s death cleared his path back to power. After 
two years of manoeuvring, Deng and his supporters emerged as winners and 
in 1978, the Third Plenum of the 11
th
 Party Congress confirmed Deng as 
China’s new leader and signalled the beginning of the “reform and opening 
up” era. China’s transformation from a command economy to a socialist 
market economy in which capitalist labour relations would be gradually re-
introduced and eventually come to dominate had begun.  
124 Tim Pringle 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 8, July 2016 
 
 
However, this was to be no Chicago-school influenced explosion of 
privatisation as witnessed in Chile in the 1970s or following the collapse of 
the USSR in the 1990s.
2
 The Chinese road away from state socialism is 
summed up in the Chinese idiom “crossing the river while feeling for the 
stones”, that highlights the gradual nature of the transition. Nevertheless, 
with the benefit of hindsight, the writing was on the wall for the Chinese 
working class fairly early on in the process: in 1982, the CPC removed the 
right to strike from the Constitution. At the time, this was justified on the 
basis that Chinese workers “owned” the enterprises that most of them were 
employed in. As a consequence, labour disputes were not seen as disputes 
between labour and capital but as “internal” and between the “people” rather 
than between classes.
3
 Again with hindsight, the net result was that just as 
China began to welcome foreign capital back to its Eastern and Southern 
shores – albeit cautiously and incrementally – the party announced its 
position in the new era: pro-capital in order to be pro-employment. 
Throughout the reform era, the CPC has consistently linked its political 
survival with the social stability it believes employment promotion brings.
4
 
In this situation, the legality of strikes remained a grey area. They were 
neither criminalised nor protected under law. In any case, the dramatic 
increase in strikes since 2004 suggests that workers have not been deterred 
by the lack of legal clarity and, on occasion, have even used it to their 
advantage. 
In the transition period, a perfect storm was brewing for the working class: 
in the then largely unknown world beyond Chinese borders, neoliberalism 
heralded a “momentous shift towards greater social inequality and the 
restoration of economic power to the upper class”.5 Within China, the 
gradual return of private capital and competitively-driven labour markets 
heralded the demise of industrial relations based on the integrated interests 
of managers and workers within a 单位 (work unit – usually involving at 
least one state-owned enterprise) working to meet production targets 
                                                 
2
 PRINGLE, T. AND CLARKE, S. The Challenge of Transition: Trade unions in Russia, 
China and Vietnam. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
3
INTERNATIONAL HONG KONG LIAISON OFFICE. Available at: 
[http://www.ihlo.org/IS/000805.html] Accessed on 20 May 2015. See also: 
[http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/ACFTU/000204.html]. 2002. Accessed 27 May 2015.  
4
 WHITE, G. “Restructuring the working class: labor reform in post-Mao China”. In: 
DIRLIK, A. and MEISNER, M. (eds.) Marxism and the Chinese experience. New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1989, pp. 152-170; NAUGHTON, B. Growing out of the plan: Chinese 
economic reform 1978-1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; BLECHER, 
M. “Hegemony and workers’ politics in China”. China Quarterly. 170, 2002. pp. 283-303. 
5
 HARVEY, D. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 26.  
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negotiated with the central planners. In their place came contract-based 
time-defined capitalist labour relationships as the state worked to create an 
investment friendly environment aimed at attracting foreign investment 
initially led by capitalists from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and South 
Korea.  
The storm did indeed hit the Chinese working class, but the warning flag 
was not officially hoisted in full view until the 15
th
 Party Congress held in 
1997 with the slogans 裁员增效 (shed jobs to increase efficiency) and抓大
放小 (let go of small and medium size enterprises and hold on to the large 
ones).
6
 The Congress announced full-scale restructuring and at least partial 
privatisation of the state sector. Small and medium-sized state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and some larger ones were privatised or bankrupted 
while the state held on to larger enterprises in key sectors such as energy 
and construction. The storm struck hardest in the urban heartlands of Maoist 
industry generating up to 50 million lay-offs of state-owned workers by 
2004.
7
 This traumatic and contested unmaking of the traditional working 
class
8
 was accompanied by the making of what some researchers refer to a 
“new working class”9 or 新工人群体 – literally new groups of workers.10 
By the end of 2009, China had just under 230 million internal migrant 
workers,
11
 most of whom were working in the private sector: joint ventures 
between foreign capital and Chinese companies, foreign-owned firms, 
Chinese-owned firms – including labour dispatch agencies providing agency 
workers to SOEs and township and village enterprises known as TVEs. 
These were the relics of agricultural communes that were privatised 
following a period of local government-led enterprise.
12
 The pluralisation of 
ownership took full advantage of a transition period with characteristics 
                                                 
6
 PRINGLE, T. Trade Unions in China: the challenge of labour unrest. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2011, pp. 56-86. 
7
 PRINGLE, T. and LEUNG, A. “Causes, implementation and consequences of ‘xiagang’”. 
In: LUK, P. (ed.) Xiagang: Sacrifice in the Transformation of Labour Policy in the China 
from State to Market. Hong Kong: Asia Monitor Resource Centre.  
8
 CHEN FENG. “Industrial restructuring and workers’ resistance in China”. Modern China. 
2003, pp. 236-62. 
9
 CHAN, Jenny; PUN, Ngai; SELDEN, Mark. “The Politics of Global Production: Apple, 
Foxconn and China’s New Working Class”. New Technology, Work and Employment. Vol. 
28, n. 2, 2013, pp. 100-15. 
10
 吕途。 中国新工人迷失与崛起。北京：法律出版社。2013. p. 11 
11
 ILO. “Labour Migration”. Available at: [http://www.ilo.org/beijing/areas-of-work/labour-
migration/lang--en/index.htm]. Accessed 10 January 2015.  
12
 WU FULONG. “China’s changing urban governance in the transition towards a more 
market-orientated economy”. Urban Studies. Vol. 39, n. 7, 2002, p. 1075.  
126 Tim Pringle 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 8, July 2016 
 
 
often found in post socialist states: an evolving and largely non-enforced 
regulatory framework for labour relations; close links between powerful 
local government officials and agents of capital; a monopolistic trade union 
under the leadership of the ruling Party
13
; and severe repression of workers 
who attempted to organise autonomously.
14
  
Capitalists in China have proved adept at operating in this pro-investor/pro-
capital framework and have worked hard at either taking advantage of 
existing fragmentary pressures in labour forces or creating new ones. The 
large-scale labour migration of the reform era has been conducted under the 
administrative constraints of the hukou system that restricts access to public 
and welfare services to one’s place of birth. The consequent absence of state 
support for labour migrants has forced workers to rely on informal networks 
of support such as hometown associations. In some cases, capitalists were 
able to manipulate these networks as instruments of division; in other cases, 
they served to unite workers as struggles unfolded.
15
 Processes of 
informalisation associated with neoliberalism have also been important to 
capitalists. For example, workplace solidarity has been weakened by the 
widespread use of student interns by companies such as Foxconn
16
 as well 
as agency workers in key sectors such as the auto industry.
17
  
Incidents of resistance arising from the return of capitalist labour relations 
and related protests have increased numerically over time. Official data for 
so-called “mass incidents” (群体性事件), which are loosely defined as 
expressions of “civil unrest” 18 involving significant numbers of people, 
state there were 87,000 such protests in 2005.
19
 Researcher Yu Jianrong 
argued that there were over 90,000 in 2009 – with over 30 per cent of these 
related to labour incidents.
20
 However, the number of strikes as a component 
                                                 
13
 This was not the case in the former USSR where the state trade union split from the Party 
in 1987 eventually forming the FNPR.  
14
 PRINGLE AND CLARKE. Op Cit.  
15
 KING-CHI CHAN, Chris. “Strike and changing workplace relations in a Chinese global 
factory’. Industrial Relations Journal”. Vol. 40, n.1, 2009, pp 60-77. 
16
 CHAN, Jenny; PUN, Ngai; and SELDEN, Mark. “Interns or Workers? China’s Student 
Labor 
Regime.” Asian Studies 2016 (forthcoming).  
17
 ZHANG, Lu. Inside China’s Automobile Factories: The Politics of Labor and Worker 
Resistance. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
18
 JUSTINE ZHENG REN. ‘‘Mass incidents’ in China’. Available at: 
[http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/13/mass-incidents-in-china/] Accessed on 12 
January 2015. 
19
 FREEMAN, W. “The accuracy of “mass incidents’”. Financial Times. 2 March 2010.  
20
 于建嵘. ‘ 群体性事件症结在于官民矛盾’. 中国报道. 2010. pp. 50-51.  
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of these figures is not known, and the state prohibits publication of national 
statistics on strike days lost. Indeed, in 2006 it stopped publishing data on 
“mass incidents” altogether. An alternative indication of unrest can be found 
in official records of labour dispute mediation and arbitration committees 
along with civil court records. These sources reflect the state’s efforts to 
construct formal institutions of labour dispute settlement that I will discuss 
in the next section. Despite the well-documented problems with the data 
collection
21
, they suggest a story of rising rights consciousness 
22
 and a 
willingness to pursue employers through juridical channels. Figure 1 below 
shows the significant rise in arbitration via cases and numbers of workers 
involved. The leap in 2008 was the outcome of the promulgation of the 
Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law and the impact of the 
financial crisis that led to over 26 million lay-offs.
23
 
Interesting though these figures are as a guide to overall trends, they tell us 
little about the changing forms of labour unrest or, indeed, the emergence of 
a labour movement.
24
 Increased reporting of strikes in the state media has 
prompted the use of internet technology to compile strike maps based on 
media and witness reports. China Labour Bulletin (CLB) recorded 1793 
strikes in the 2013-14 period with just over a quarter occurring in 
Guangdong province.
25
 The map records 235 incidents in the first quarter of 
2014, an increase of 49 per cent on the same period in 2013 that had 158 
incidents, and 180 per cent higher than the second quarter of 2012, which 
featured 84 strikes. CLB qualify this increase by stating that the rapid 
development of verifiable social media reports of disputes included in their 
database that have made strikes more visible.
26
  
 
                                                 
21
 PRINGLE AND CLARKE. Op. Cit. pp. 120-123. 
22
 GALLAGHER, M and DONG, B. “Legislating Harmony: Labor Law Reform in 
Contemporary China”. In: KURUVILLA, Sarosh; LEE, Ching Kwan and GALLAGHER, 
Mary E. (eds.) From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalisation. Ithaca: ILR Press, 2011, pp 36-60. 
COONEY, S., BIDDULPH, S. and YING ZHU. Law and Fair Work in China. London: 
Routledge, 2013.  
23
 MITCHELL, T. “China’s Migrant Workers Face Bleak Outlook”. Financial Times. 9 
February 2009. 
24
 PRINGLE, T. “Reflections on Labor in China: From a moment to a movement”. South 
Atlantic Quarterly. 112, 1, 2013, pp. 191-202. CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN. “The 
Workers Movement in China: 2011-13”. Available at: [http://www.clb.org.hk/en/research-
reports]. Accessed 17 January 2015.  
25
 CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN. ‘中国工人运动观察报告2013-14’. Available at: 
[http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/stepping-breach-labour-groups-start-take-role-trade-
union-china] Accessed on 21 May 2015.  
26
 CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN. The strike map is available here: 
[http://www.numble.com/PHP/mysql/clbmape.html] Accessed 12 May 2015. 
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Figure 1: Labour Arbitration 1996-2011 
 
As dramatic as the statistics are, the changing nature of resistance is perhaps 
more important for our discussion here. Put very generally, there has been a 
transformation in the methods workers deploy to pursue demands. Strikes 
aimed at forcing employers to negotiate over wages, conditions and more 
recently social insurance payments have replaced short protests that had a 
much lower impact on production and were aimed at pressuring state 
officials to intervene directly and discipline employers over below-
minimum wages, wage arrears, overtime payments as well as compensation 
for factory movement to other areas. Over the last five years, the rise in 
what might be termed non-defensive strikes with demands that go beyond 
state-determined minimum wages has been further nuanced by a marked 
trend in strikes related to arrears in social security contributions or 
compensation relocation. While seemingly defensive in nature, this 
additional set of rights-based demands nevertheless reflects the same 
Strike and Labour Relations in China 129 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 8, July 2016 
 
increased capacity to organise against capital and state that has resulted in 
wage-based strikes.  
This shift in the forms of labour unrest is certainly not uniform across the 
country, and I do not suggest that a protest aimed at involving the state rules 
out a strike aimed at bargaining with capital. It has been characterised by 
some as a transition from protests over rights that have been fragmented by 
state juridical procedures into individual disputes to strikes over interests 
that are based on collective bargaining as an instrument of dispute resolution 
and even dispute avoidance.
27
 The state, the ACFTU and labour 
representatives and their supporters have, to various degrees and for 
different reasons, advocated forms of collective bargaining.
28
 Employers 
have been less enthusiastic.
29
 In the following section will attempt to 
unpack, briefly, the logistics of this complicated and nuanced 
transformation.  
 
2. The changing trajectory of labour unrest 
Labour protests throughout the 1990s and the first few years of this century 
reflected the early processes of China’s transition from a command to a 
market economy outlined above. As we have said, the main tactic of 
workers in both the state and private sectors was to get state officials 
involved in reaching a solution. But the logic behind these tactics was not 
the same for state workers as it was for migrants. The latter were many 
hundreds of miles from their home – often in special economic zones set up 
in south or east China. As we have seen, their ability to survive without 
wages away from family support networks was severely constrained by 
administrative restrictions on their rights to stay in a city without work or 
access to welfare associated with urban residence. Moreover, there was a 
large reserve army of labour in the countryside enabling employers to 
                                                 
27
 CHAN, C.K.C. and HUI, E.S.I. “The Development of Collective Bargaining in China: 
From ‘Collective Bargaining by Riot’ to ‘Party State-led Wage Bargaining”. China 
Quarterly. N.217, 2014, pp. 221-242.  
28
 THE PEOPLE’S DAILY. ‘中共中央国务院关于构建和谐劳动关系的意见’. Available 
at: [http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2015-04/09/nw.D110000renmrb_20150409_2-
01.htm] Accessed 20 May 2015. CHUN HAN WONG. “China aims to smooth labour 
unrest”. Wall Street Journal, 2015. Available at:  
[http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-aims-to-soothe-labor-unrest-1428478396] Accessed 7 
May 2015.  
29
 HUI, E.S.I. and CHAN, C.K.C. “The politics of labour legislation in southern China: 
How foreign chambers of commerce and government agencies influence collective 
bargaining laws”. International Labour Review. N.153, 4, 2014, pp. 587-607. 
130 Tim Pringle 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 8, July 2016 
 
 
replace “troublemakers” with or without the coordinated assistance of the 
local state. As the scholar Han Deqiang observed in 2002: 
Outside the gates of every enterprise in our so-called Special Economic 
Zones you can see small crowds of workers who are waiting to be hired 
even if the factory has no hiring policy at the time. When they do hire, 
this small crowd quickly turns into a crush of desperate migrant 
workers.
30
  
Trade union representation for migrants was weak to non-existent. In fact, 
the ACFTU did not recognise migrant workers as potential members until 
2003 and generally referred to them by using the state-constructed parlance 
of “peasant workers” (农民工). Faced with these constraints, workers’ 
tactics focussed on a mix of marches down to government offices or even a 
highway blocking – as opposed to declared strikes and picket lines – as well 
as testing the evolving juridical procedures of arbitration and the courts 
sometimes with the help of labour NGOs that were especially active in the 
southern province of Guangdong.  
In contrast, the logic underpinning resistance by workers in the restructuring 
state sector was determined by a somewhat different context. There were 
four main differences. First, although SOE workers were being 
automatically enrolled into the union, the possibility of the Party-led 
ACFTU leading opposition to a key CPC policy – SOE restructuring – were 
almost zero. Constitutionally, the ACFTU’s role was – and is – blurred by 
references to its mission to protect “the overall interests of the entire 
Chinese people” rather than the sectional interests of groups of workers. It 
works to “implement the Party’s basic line of centring on [the] economic 
construction”.31 As such, the union spent far more energy persuading its 
members to accept phased lay-offs and seek alternative employment – often 
vulnerable self-employment – rather than challenging the policy itself. In 
this way, the organisation adhered to its traditional role developed in the 
command economy era as a productivity orientated labour welfare 
bureaucracy rather than a trade union representing the interests of its 
members. Second, the redundancy policy was partially ameliorated by state-
imposed obligations on SOEs to keep laid off workers on their books for 
three years, provide retraining and livelihood stipends as well as medical 
                                                 
30
 Observation from the floor made at the Asia Pacific Research Network China and the 
WTO conference, 4-6 November 2002, Guangzhou.  
31
 CONSTITUTION OF THE ACFTU (1998). Available at: 
[http://www.acftu.org.cn/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=48&aid=237]. Accessed 24 May 
2015.  
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expenses. While these obligations were often ignored, acquisition of such 
entitlements nevertheless became the focus of widespread, but scattered 
protests
32
 and workers rarely demanded their jobs back. Third, the 
development of more actively class conscious and linked up resistance was 
constrained by the political framing of restructuring itself as references to 
the sensitive term of “privatisation” were studiously avoided in the official 
discourse. When the term was deployed either by radical market reformers 
or in the narrative of resistance, workers were more likely to refuse to “enter 
new property relations disadvantageous to them”.33 Finally, the material 
conditions necessary for strike action were rarely in place. The careful 
sequencing of the restructuring project by the state meant that workers’ 
protests erupted after they were stood down.
34
 As one labour academic from 
the ACFTU’s Labour Relations Institute pointed out at a seminar in Hong 
Kong in July 2001 there was often “no work to strike against!” (无工可罢!)  
As we can see, throughout this period the balance of class forces was 
heavily weighted in favour of capital. Migrant workers’ wages in 
Guangdong did not rise in real terms for 12 years
35
 and across China up to 
50 million SOE workers found themselves moved “from the centre to the 
margins of society”.36 This grim scenario began to change from 2003 
onwards and as a result, the passive and defensive nature of both migrant 
and urban worker protests depicted above has gradually transformed into 
resistance primarily based on strikes or at least the threat of them. For 
reasons of space, I will only highlight what I think are the three most 
important factors explaining this change. There are, of course, many more. 
Firstly, a bank of knowledge on the factory system itself has accumulated 
among migrant workers sometimes with the assistance of LNGOs. In turn, 
these LNGOs are nurturing a cadre of worker representatives with 
experience of collective bargaining and organisational leadership – 
sometimes both. In more recent years, the internet and social media has 
facilitated both the transfer of such knowledge and the dissemination of 
information on strikes. Workers and their supporters have used the 
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technology as a tool to organise in and beyond a given strike location. For 
example, mobile phone apps have been deployed to organise solidarity 
actions by sympathetic groups (群) of activists, lawyers, scholars and 
students – such as raising money to pay hospital fees of strikers injured by 
police attacks on picket lines.
37
 In another example, workers representatives 
at Lide shoe factory used the Chinese mobile phone and computer 
application weibo to publish up to 28 strike and organising updates.
38
 
Secondly, the political and material space between migrants and urban 
workers has diminished over the last decade. This is the result of a mix of 
factors, but primarily the privatisation of SOEs and convergence with 
private sector labour relations regimes; and the state’s alarm at growing 
inequalities and policies to address them, especially the policy of rapid 
urbanisation of central and western areas and the concomitant loosening of 
urban residence restrictions referred to earlier. While this has not yet 
produced a significant trend of examples of sustained solidarity between 
urban and migrant workers, the material conditions for such a scenario are 
increasingly in place as the distance between production and the 
reproduction of labour narrows.
39
  
But perhaps the most important factor driving the emergence of a labour 
movement based on well-publicised strikes as opposed to isolated protests 
has been the labour shortages that began in South and East China and are 
now a key feature of Chinese labour markets in many parts of the country.
40
 
This has put workers in a much stronger bargaining position. The 
aforementioned absence of statistics on strike days lost renders this change 
difficult to quantify but there is a growing body of labour academics 
referring to the “collectivisation of labour relations” emerging in the wake 
of labour unrest in part generated by structural labour shortages.
41
 While 
some of this literature is based on legal reform,
42
 others have analysed 
labour unrest, strikes and institutional responses to track this shift in the 
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balance of class forces.
43
 As we shall see in the following section, the 
combination of shortages of labour and increasing militancy moderated state 
policy under the previous leadership of Hu Jintao as the consolidation of a 
legal framework seemed to open up the space for labour militancy and 
foster a qualified tolerance of LNGOs activities at least in the South. The 
current regime of Xi Jinping has been far less tolerant although strikes 
continue to be a significant feature of labour relations keeping them near the 
top of the state’s agenda.44  
 
3. The State Response to Labour Unrest 
The response of the Chinese state – including the ACFTU – to labour 
militancy fits into three broad categories: legal, representational and 
political. My focus here is on the first two categories, but I will 
contextualise the discussion with a brief foray into a political analysis of the 
state’s response to unrest in general.  
In the broadest terms, the Chinese state moved from repression to 
concession in dealing with unrest in general and labour unrest in particular 
during the Hu Jintao era.
45
 Finding a balance between stability and rights 
has been an obsession with Chinese officials in Guangdong for over a 
decade. Failure to prevent an enterprise-based strike from developing into a 
strike wave can have serious career-related repercussions for state officials, 
and there is a reluctance to resort to repression for fear of providing the 
proverbial spark that ignites the prairie fire. The “soft” approach of the Hu-
Wen era is well-documented in the literature
46
 and represented a significant 
drain on non-police budgets as resources were re-directed towards 
upholding social peace. There is also the strong possibility that the legacy of 
this approach will constrain the development of more sustainable forms of 
dispute resolution as have been already piloted such as annual collective 
bargaining.
47
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In contrast, the Xi Jinping era has displayed a far less tolerant attitude 
towards both civil society and labour activism since 2012.
48
 In Guangdong 
and no doubt beyond, this has spilled over into violent assaults on labour 
activists by unidentified men and the deployment of riot police in some 
strikes but does not appear to have had any marked impact on the 
willingness of workers to take such actions.
49
 Indeed, the anti-corruption 
campaign that has accompanied the Xi crackdown has also been directed at 
both state officials and capitalists. It may even be an opportunity for 
workers to pursue non-wage claims such as embezzlement of workers’ 
social security funds as was partly the case at the Yue Yuen strike discussed 
below.  
After years of gradualism, China’s legal framework for labour relations 
received a considerable boost in 2008 when three important labour-related 
laws were passed: the Labour Contract Law (LCL); the Labour Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration Law (LMAL) and the Employment Law that was 
designed to coordinate employment agencies and reduce discrimination in 
the labour market. The LCL was an attempt to slow the rate of 
informalisation of employment and discipline employers into issuing 
permanent contracts to employees who had completed two consecutive 
fixed-term contracts (Article 14). In contrast to the earlier national Labour 
Law on 1995, the LCL carries an entire chapter on collective contracts 
signalling the state’s intention to move away from the individualised nature 
of the first national Labour Law promulgated in 1995 and perhaps giving 
more credibility to the ‘collectivisation’ literature referred to earlier.  
The LMAL was part of a general policy of channelling disputes into a two-
tiered juridical system of dispute resolution thus containing militancy in a 
rights-based discourse that keeps people in the courts and off the streets. As 
we can see from Figure 1, this certainly had an effect in terms of the sheer 
numbers of workers applying for arbitration, and the data trend is largely the 
same for court settlements.
50
 It also facilitated a consolidation of “legal 
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activism” that crossed over into ACFTU output as it trained substantial 
numbers of lawyers to represent members. However, the union has tended to 
stick to cases it can win. In Guangdong province, the subsequent vacuum 
has been filled partially by LNGOs alongside growing numbers of self-
trained paralegal activists and labour lawyers. The attitude of the 
Guangdong Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU) towards such groups has 
wavered between offers of cooperation to wariness and suspicion of foreign 
funding and interference – stances that usually reflect the wider political 
climate of the time.  
An important addition to the framework came in 2011 with the Social 
Insurance Law. Article 95 expanded all five components of social insurance 
to all workers including migrant workers. The five components are 
pensions, unemployment, medical, work-related injury and maternity 
insurance. Importantly for migrant workers, the law stipulated that social 
insurance accounts may be moved from one workplace to another. 
However, this has proved very difficult to implement due to the “highly 
localized nature of the social welfare system...getting different jurisdictions 
to share information is fraught with bureaucratic and technical difficulties, 
especially for workers coming from rural areas of China”.51 Coverage for 
migrant workers remains very low. For example, according to a survey 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2013, only 15 per cent of 
migrant workers employed outside their home province had pension 
accounts.
52
 At the same time, its promulgation has served as a legal context 
for strikes over social insurance premiums especially among older migrant 
workers. The strike discussed below by 40,000 workers at the Yue Yuen 
shoe factory in April 2014 was an important example. 
The second tier of the Chinese state’s response to labour unrest relates to the 
crucial question of representation – in my view the “elephant in the room” 
that impinges on all discussions on labour relations in China. As we have 
seen, the ACFTU remains a Party-led institution that has been slow and 
constrained in its adaption to the challenges presented by capitalist labour 
relations. Its role during the command economy era was primarily directive 
rather than representative and prioritised the meeting of production targets 
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and welfare rather than defence of their members’ interests.53 The 
organisation was hit hard by SOE restructuring losing up to 30 million 
members and a large number of experienced cadres prompting a 
membership drive that focused on migrant workers and the private sector. 
This has been enormously successful as the union had over 239 million 
members and rising in 2010 and a much stronger formal presence in the 
private sector.
54
 
However, the organisation remains limited in its capacity to represent 
members’ interests. At enterprise level, the issue is not just party leadership, 
but how the absence of freedom of association produces a structural reliance 
on capital. As I make clear in the following analysis of significant strikes, 
until recently, enterprise-level trade union representatives were almost 
always appointed by the employer and reliant on the latter for their 
livelihood – indeed this is often still the case despite regulatory constraints 
on such practices. While union appointments are supposed to be ratified by 
the next level up in the trade union, higher unions rarely get involved in 
such matters unless actions by workers compel them to do so. Strikes in 
which workers call for a re-organisation or re-election of an enterprise trade 
union committee are particularly important as improved representation is 
germane to developing an effective system of collective bargaining. But it is 
not elections in and of themselves that are the crucial issue here. Rather, it is 
the sustainability of, and support for, the trade union committee that 
emerges from an election process.  
 
4. Significant Strikes  
The famous 19-day strike in May 2010 by auto-parts workers and student 
interns on “vocational training” at the Nanhai Honda factory in Foshan kick-
started a strike wave that generated wage increases of up to 40 per cent in 
and beyond Guangdong.
55
 While most of the copy cat strikes that followed 
focused on pay, the Nanhai strike also demanded a re-organised trade union 
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committee at the plant.
56
 Following opposition to the strikers’ demands from 
management at the factory and the local district-level union – the latter 
leading to physical scuffles – more reform-minded union organisations 
located at a higher level stepped in and organised the election of a trade 
union committee. The higher union also facilitated talks between 
management and elected worker representatives that won a 32 per cent pay 
rise for the workers and a 70 per cent increase for the student interns.
57
 
Subsequent rounds of collective bargaining at the plant produced well-
above-inflation pay rises. However, the union committee has since been 
consistently undermined by management with union elections restricted to 
small sections of 20 or 30 workers electing a union committee that is largely 
devoid of shop floor representatives.
58
 Despite another short and victorious 
strike in 2013, key activists have left the factory and the previously ground-
breaking union branch appears to have “retreated to the backwaters of the 
workers’ movement”.59  
Nevertheless, the Nanhai strike is often referred to as a watershed moment 
in the emergence of China’s labour movement.60 There are two aspects of 
the strike that justify this status. First, the widespread global and local 
publicity that the strike received has finally put to bed the passive victim 
narrative that had underpinned much mainstream opinion of workers in 
China up until the strike. Of course, the growing confidence of Chinese 
workers to constrain capital by collective action had been discussed in 
academic papers, internal reports of both LNGO staffers, capitalist networks 
and the state as well as the occasionally insightful media report from 
approximately 2008 onwards. But the channelling of this energy into a 
globally supported 19-day strike that included the demand for an elected 
trade union committee eliciting the public support of senior trade union 
officials in Guangdong province was new territory.  
Furthermore, as the momentum continued and the strikes spread, they 
generated an outcome significant from an ACFTU policy perspective and, 
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more importantly, a labour movement perspective. The demands for 
representation at Nanhai did not suddenly emerge. Similar demands for 
improved accountability had been growing in Guangdong for some time. 
However, traditional regulatory conditions for direct elections of trade union 
representatives had been the absence of labour disputes or militancy of any 
form as well as restrictions on the size of factories.
61
 But the dilemma facing 
the ACFTU was that the increase in strike action lent urgency to the need 
for a more proactive response from trade unions on issues of both 
representation and bargaining. In Guangdong, the combination of predatory 
capital, labour shortages, experienced LNGOs and increased strike activity 
persuaded reform-minded leaders in union federations at city and provincial 
level to allow contained experiments in the direct election of enterprise-
level trade union representatives and processes of bargaining. While not 
unprecedented
62
, these initiatives go way beyond previous pilot projects 
elsewhere in China.
63
 However, they are largely restricted to specific sectors 
where workers enjoy significant structural power having won significant 
pay rises and concessions. In terms of policy, union elections were no 
longer confined to safe havens of strike-free factories and came to be seen 
by more forward-thinking union officials as a way of improving the 
representative performance of the ACFTU. This change in policy was 
motivated in part by wanting to defend workers’ interests but equally, if not 
more so, by the need to maintain broader stability via the reduction of 
strikes. As the former chair of the Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions 
explained during a discussion in 2014: 
We were concerned about the strike for two reasons. First, it was a 
manifestation of the power workers had acquired under the conditions of 
globalisation. Secondly, it was a threat to the upholding of social stability 
and economic development. These two things are closely linked and they 
are both a concern and challenge for our trade unions and their future 
development.
64
  
Following further strikes and elections of trade union committees, the 
Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) announced in May 2012 that 
direct elections for enterprise-level trade unions would be rolled out across 
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163 enterprises in the city with more than 1,000 employees. Though 
significant from a policy perspective and opening up organising space for 
activists in the workplace, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that 
trade union elections are not as effective as strikes. Moreover, as the history 
of trade unions all too painfully demonstrates, employers can undermine 
elections by ensuring middle managers are elected rather than workers or by 
harassing, dismissing or promoting elected representatives as well as 
denying union time. In October 2013, university student researchers from 
the LNGO Student and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehaviour 
(SACOM) wrote an open letter to the SFTU. They claimed that only two out 
the five factories their researchers visited clandestinely had effective union 
branches.
65
 
Potentially more important is the impact strikes are having in generating 
both experience and leadership in an emerging labour movement that 
appears to be acquiring a momentum despite attacks on activists and a 
repressive environment. Two strikes in the shoe industry demonstrate my 
point. A significant strike shook the authorities of Dongguan city both in its 
scale of 40,000 workers and the intensity of ill-feeling toward management. 
The strike was ostensibly over the failure of management at the giant 
Taiwanese-owned Yue Yuen shoe plant to pay full social security premiums 
into workers’ accounts. However, while this was definitely an issue, activist 
blogs, interviews with veteran workers and LNGOs providing support 
revealed that the strike was also connected to frustration with overall pay 
levels. There was no direct bargaining with management and the strike was 
important due to its size, duration of almost two weeks and the symbolic 
message of shop-floor power and solidarity. As the strike died down in the 
face of management concessions and strong pressure on workers to return to 
worker by the authorities, including the GFTU, one veteran worker 
predicted in an interview on a blog called Worker View Point that there 
“will be a big strike within half a year and there will only be one demand – a 
raise of at least 30 per cent. Workers can’t live on 2,300-2,400 Yuan!”66 The 
impact and lessons of the strike, in particular the need for accountable 
representatives and collective bargaining re-emerged not at Yue Yuen, but 
bore fruit at a much smaller shoe factory approximately 40 miles away.  
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The capacity of workers to elect and re-elect bargaining representatives was 
illustrated by a series of strikes and negotiations at the Lide Shoe Factory. 
The initial dispute was triggered in April 2014 by concerns over the 
factory’s planned relocation and subsequent attempts by management to 
force workers to sign new contracts in order to avoid social insurance 
arrears dating back to 1995.
67
 During the following six months, increasing 
numbers of the 2,500 workers at Lide took part in three strikes, the last 
involving 1,000 workers in December 2014. The time between April and 
December was used by workers to acquire training in collective bargaining, 
electing representatives and organising with support from local LNGOs. 
During the third strike, workers’ representatives immediately set about 
organising a solidarity fund and a social media blog as well as appointing 
picket marshals and media coordinators. Arrests of workers, issues with 
accountability and frequent bargaining in bad faith by management
68
 
eventually led to a five-night and six-day picket of the factory gates by 300 
workers and their representatives in April 2015 to prevent management 
from moving equipment and goods to another location.
69
 Following 
meetings with Lide and local government representatives, Lide agreed to 
pay all outstanding social insurance payments and pay relocation 
compensation in accordance with the law. The New Citizen Movement’s 
website referred to the victory as an historic breakthrough in terms of 
solidarity building and collective bargaining as well as a significant 
breakthrough for the labour movement in Guangdong’s Pearl River Delta.70 
This said, the focus group discussions I attended with four – and this has to 
be said – “inspiring” women organisers from Lide in the aftermath of their 
victory also revealed the challenges for the future evolution of a labour 
movement growing from below. Chief among them is the industrial 
upgrading in Guangdong province that was at least in part behind the Lide 
decision to relocate and downsize. All the organisers I spoke with had taken 
the redundancy pay outs they had won through struggle rather than offers of 
re-employment with due seniority of up to 19 years in the case of one 
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organiser. Two of them said they would work with the LNGOs that had 
offered assistance throughout the struggle. One was not sure and a fourth 
planned to help run her son’s business. The trend of experienced workplace 
representatives leaving workplaces – often due to dismissal – following a 
dispute will likely continue against a background of relocation and closures 
arising from increasing diversity in capital flows to other provinces or 
abroad and an ongoing drop in exports. While the experience of such leaders 
and organisers is unlikely to be entirely lost, the labour movement would 
gain more from their ongoing presence in the workplace, negotiating and 
constraining capital, ensuring union accountability and building sector-level 
networks. Training from the outside is no substitute for representation and 
experience on the inside.  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that when viewed through a labour relation lens, China’s 
“exceptionality” fades somewhat. It is replaced, or perhaps upstaged, by the 
growing militancy of a working class that is beginning to constrain capital. 
Also in sharp focus are the efforts by the party state to neutralise an 
emerging labour movement. Its strategy has included attempts to slow the 
rate of informalisation with legal reforms, notably via the Labour Contract 
Law; and experimentally, via toleration of accountable collective bargaining 
between workers’ representatives and employers – albeit in what often 
amounts to factory “closure bargaining”. In cases of annual collective 
bargaining, both state union and capital have moved to head off the potential 
for accountable collective bargaining. They have generated further militancy 
by taking back representation, to various degrees, under ACFTU control. 
This happened at Honda Nanhai factory and in the auto sector in general. 
Nevertheless, what is new and most significant in this scenario is the 
emergence of a layer of workers’ representatives, collective bargaining 
representatives and organisers who are acquiring significant experience due 
to the sheer frequency of strikes. This small group does not directly 
challenge the ACFTU but instead focuses almost entirely on collective 
bargaining and organisational skills in the workplace. Its members have so 
far survived the state’s more recent attempts to intimidate, co-opt and in 
some cases imprison them in order to reduce their influence. Their ability to 
continue to have an impact on the ongoing evolution of China’s labour 
relations and labour movement will depend on the party state not resorting 
to more comprehensive repression and equally important, the continuing 
frequency of strikes. 
 
142 Tim Pringle 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 8, July 2016 
 
 
 
 
